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Introduction  
Citizens everywhere expect their leaders to protect them. Indeed, that is the first responsibility of 
governments and their security infrastructures. But the problem of terrorism has provided a new 
context for national security decision-making, a process that now involves the entire spectrum of 
government institutions. Terrorist actions are political events masquerading as military attacks, 
and thus require governments to blend “soft power” tools with the “hard power” responses that 
cannot be avoided. [1] The so-called “war” on terrorism is not a war at all; it is a political contest 
that can only be won at the political level. Terrorists have turned Clausewitz on his head; they 
wage war by other means.  
Terrorism is not about action but rather about reaction. Terrorists understand how easily 
governments can militarize their responses. Political leaders, whether guided by protective 
instinct or dictatorial opportunism, overreact on cue. Dissuading potential terrorists from resorting 
to violence in the first place is a strategy that is more challenging to execute and more difficult to 
evaluate than using brute force. Indeed, governments are confronted with Kafka’s choices: calling 
the doctor to explain and perhaps cure the disease of terrorism, or calling the locksmith to 
separate terrorists from the rest of society.[2] Our leaders have to make both calls. 
The Doctor Is In 
Any attempt to understand the problem of terrorism begins with identifying root causes. Simply 
stated, root causes are conditions within our societies that provide fertile ground for terrorism to 
germinate. These conditions operate across whole societies, influencing individuals in different 
ways. They do not inevitably lead to terrorism, but they are certainly the first step down that path. 
Each government faces its own unique set of historical, social, geographic, and political 
conditions. Poverty, ignorance, and injustice often top the list of root causes, but bad governance 
could be a more important factor (this suggests that better governance can go a long way toward 
defeating terrorism). In some cases, a government’s foreign policy could be considered a root 
cause. A lack of social cohesion certainly belongs on this list. There are many possibilities from 
which to choose.  
The second, essential step to terrorism is motivation. Acts of terrorism are carried out by 
individuals and small groups, motivated by specific factors superimposed on root causes. These 
factors include Louise Richardson’s trinity of rage, recognition, and revenge.[3] But sources of 
motivation alone cannot propel ordinary citizens to undertake extreme measures against innocent 
fellow citizens; they must be induced by charismatic leaders and encouraged by similarly 
motivated peers. Terrorism is a social activity driven by group dynamics as well as root causes 
and motivation. Individuals do things in groups they would never do on their own.[4]  
What motivates individuals, acting in small groups, to adopt a strategy of terrorism?[5] Frustration 
and fear top this list. Unhappy people anywhere, given the right circumstances, can be dangerous 
to the rest of society. Here it is useful to revisit Maslow’s hierarchy, with physiological 
requirements at the bottom and self-actualization at the top. In the middle come love and esteem, 
for the self and for others. It is after their most basic needs are met that human beings tend to 
raise their expectations, a condition leading to disappointment and perhaps a resort to extreme 
behavior.[6] Governments cannot monitor individuals according to their places on this hierarchy, 
but they can create the conditions that allow their citizens to move in the direction of self-
actualization. The potential for this mobility is what governments must explain and nurture within 
their societies.  
We can go back further than Maslow, all the way to Plato, who divided the soul into three parts—
reason, desire, and something the Greeks called thymos. The word thymos is actually crucial to 
describing why terrorists behave the way they do. It translates literally as “spiritedness” and 
describes an innate sense of justice. Thymos captures the feeling that drives human beings to act 
without reason. Implicit in Plato’s division of the soul is that each human being has a unique 
distribution of the three parts. Ironically, soldiers share a healthy dose of thymos with their 
terrorist enemies. Both act in unreasonable ways to achieve a feeling of prestige. It may be that 
the thymotic impulse is more responsible for terrorism than anything else in the human psyche, 
linked as it is to recognition, power, and glory.[7]  
But groups of human beings do not simply hold themselves together. Individuals are held 
together by kinship and common purpose. Setting aside kinship, more common in organized 
crime than in terrorism, shared goals are the glue that binds terrorists to one another. Such goals 
are expressed through beliefs, strongly held, that present the group with an inspiring narrative 
and serve to legitimate acts of violence. This is extremist ideology: the DNA of terrorism, passed 
from generation to generation.  
The Role of Ideology  
Ideology is a rigid set of beliefs—a system of beliefs—that compels people to behave in particular 
ways. Ideology, especially the extremist version, does not allow for compromise; it is a 
Manichean system of reasoning that does not serve as a basis for day-to-day political activity.[8] 
It is in fact the antithesis of politics, a system that thrives on debate and compromise. It is also 
distinguishable from philosophy and religion, which guide how individuals choose to live. Ideology 
is about how a few individuals think society should be governed. Ideologically driven behavior 
goes beyond merely acting on principle; the transition from principle to ideology takes place when 
someone decides that all others are just plain wrong.  
Ideology is an attempt to make the world simple (an increasingly attractive proposition to many in 
the mainstream). It offers members of the group a set of basic rules, easy to follow and easy to 
teach others. Groups driven by ideology normally have strong leadership, but they do not need it. 
Adherents pursue actions that fall within the parameters of their ideology, self-organizing in 
innovative ways that are very difficult to predict—and even more difficult to counter.[9] This is the 
same phenomenon that produces flocking behavior in birds and fish. These populations have no 
leader; only a simple set of local rules, hardwired into each individual’s genes, ensuring the 
survival of the species.  
The role of ideology extends beyond that of binding individuals together and legitimizing their 
activities. Ideologies are also used to mobilize outsiders. In network fashion, terrorist 
organizations target the disaffected members of a population by attempting to convince them that 
there is an alternative way of thinking that will make their lives more meaningful (and simpler). If 
the population has a large number of disaffected individuals susceptible to the ideology, enough 
of them can be recruited.[10] Once recruited, they soon take part in successful terrorist actions, 
operations that validate and strengthen the ideology they share.[11]  
There are three basic types of ideology that motivate terrorists. The first is political philosophy. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Marxism was a key ideology for many European terrorist groups. 
Maoism continues to motivate Asian and South American groups. Environmentalism as an 
ideology has given impetus to the new phenomenon of “Eco-Terrorism.” Some would include 
Nihilism, the current manifestation of which we see in the youth gangs of Central America, and 
perhaps the flare-up of “Anti-Globalization” as an ill-defined cause of the late 1990s.[12] 
Significantly, the ideologies that originate in political theory are often superseded by political 
practice, leaving governments an opening for dialogue.  
The second type of motivating ideology is Ethnic Nationalism. The desire of small groups to earn 
recognition from the larger society often involves issues of territory, and separatism continues to 
drive political dissent in most of the world. What transforms separatist feelings into terrorism is the 
ideology associated with ethnicity. This has manifested itself most famously in Northern Ireland 
and the Basque region of Spain, but Nationalism has already done its greatest damage, 
provoking and justifying the conventional wars of the 20th century. Ethnic Nationalism is 
motivating hard-line politicians and their citizens today in places like Iraq and Pakistan, but its 
ultimate expression is being witnessed in Sri Lanka.[13]  
Religion that has taken the evolutionary leap to ideology can be a platform for the worst kind of 
atrocities. Recent examples of this phenomenon include the Oklahoma City bombing in the name 
of Christian Identity, the expanding influence of Shia extremism, and the worldwide terrorist 
activities of Al Qaeda in the name of Islam. Religious extremists have, through history, abused 
the power of the faith by transforming it into an ideology to guide destructive behavior. [14] 
Attaching religious fervor to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons reveals some truly 
frightening scenarios.  
A discussion of ideology would not be complete without mentioning the concept of “fantasy 
ideology,” best described by Lee Harris.[15] Harris has linked the historical experiences of the 
pre-Civil War American South, Mussolini’s fascist regime, Hitler’s Nazism, and Al Qaeda’s quest 
for a pan-Islamic “caliphate” together into a useful construct. What unites these cases is the 
dream-like quality of their guiding ideologies. Fantasy Ideology is the self-delusion of strong 
leaders, transferred to a wide audience. It is the capturing of mass imagination to support a vision 
that is either unattainable through mere political activity, or unachievable through war.[16] Like 
other forms of ideology, it is firmly rooted in the past. How do you counter a fantasy?  
Linked to the concept of Fantasy Ideology is the enduring appeal of cults around the world. There 
appears to be something in the human psyche that makes many of us vulnerable to destructive 
messages issued by charismatic leaders. On a micro scale (though certainly not for the families 
involved) is the “Jonestown” example of mass suicide. On a macro scale, the frightening 
experience of the Japanese with Aum Shinrikyo gives us a possible prototype for the future of 
terrorism. Cults appear where hopelessness and lack of meaning prevail, prompting some 
individuals to separate themselves from their families and other social groupings. They sacrifice 
their egos to the collective, vesting all power over their lives in one leader. The root causes of cult 
formation, then, are very similar to the root causes of terrorism itself. Within such a context, the 
appearance of highly motivated individuals armed with a lust for power and lethal charisma can 
trigger terrorism.[17] 
 
The Case of Violent Salafism 
Since the World Trade Center attacks, officials and scholars have searched for the right term to 
describe the terrorists who launched them. Merely calling them “terrorists” is correct but 
inadequate. In order to counter the ideology that fueled the attacks, there must be a way to 
distinguish the members of this particular grouping from other terrorists with different 
ideologies.[18] Terrorism is terrorism, regardless of who does it or why, but all terrorists are not 
created equal.  
The term “Islamic Terrorists” is an insult to almost all Muslims. “Islamist Terrorists” does not work 
either, offending many peaceful Muslims who call themselves Islamists (including the Prime 
Minister of Turkey). The term “Jihadists” offends Muslims by associating terrorism with one of the 
most important elements of Islamic faith, while rewarding terrorists.[19] “Islamo-fascists” does not 
work for obvious reasons, and those U.S. officials who began using the term in 2006 withdrew it 
quickly. The term “Salafist” describes a portion of the Islamic community that wishes for a return 
to the Islamic world of Mohammed and his immediate descendants. There are pious Salafists 
who do not advocate violence, but there are a significant number who do. The term “Violent 
Salafist” would appear to describe Osama bin Laden and his followers.[20]  
The main goals of Violent Salafism include replacing secular governments in Muslim lands with 
“legitimate” governments ruled by Shariah. The aggregation of such governments would lead to a 
new “Caliphate,” spanning North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast 
Asia. Also among Violent Salafist goals are to demonstrate the military power of motivated holy 
warriors, and to counter the morally corrosive effect of Western secularism (and, indeed, all 
secularism). These are not political goals; they are ideological. This is a strategy of terrorism, not 
as a means to an end but as an end in itself. Terrorist acts are used to reinforce the inevitability of 
the dream and strengthen the power of those leading the way. It is the fantasy ideology of 
“Violent Salafism” that drives the most dangerous form of terrorism today. There is no better 
example of the synergy between ideology and terrorism.  
Governments Can Help  
The advent of global terrorism has forced governments, acting together, to send targeted 
messages to people all over the world. Those messages can only be effective where policies, 
strategies, and public attitudes align. With regard to Violent Salafism, there are four multinational 
audiences to whom messages must be sent. To the opponents of Secular Islam, the messages 
should say, “The removal of religion from politics does not dilute religious belief.” To the 
sympathizers of Islamic reform, “We understand and support you.” To the supporters of Salafism, 
“You are entitled to your beliefs, but do not use violence to achieve your goals.” To the terrorist 
core of violent Salafists, “Governments, acting together, will stop you from using terrorism against 
our citizens.”[21]  
Governing is a system of incentives and disincentives to encourage or compel citizens to behave 
in certain ways. The messages governments send to all citizens should encourage individuals to 
maintain allegiance to the government (while making themselves worthy of that allegiance) and to 
foster the development of a healthy civil society through voluntary non-governmental associations. 
The messages for committed and potential terrorists should be even clearer. Terrorists must 
know that government (and the civil society it represents) will increase the expected costs of 
terrorist activity while decreasing the expected benefits.  
Governments can learn from business as they design foreign and domestic policies aimed at 
gaining the respect and allegiance they need to govern effectively. If the government can be 
imagined as a doctor trying to immunize society against the virus of terrorism, it can also be 
imagined as a provider of services whose customers are individual citizens. Viewed from that 
perspective, governments need to “brand” themselves like any commercial enterprise that wishes 
to stay in business.[22]  
Citizens of countries from Iraq to India may wonder whether terrorism is the price of democracy. 
Certainly open societies are more vulnerable to terrorism than dictatorial ones, especially in the 
short term. In the long term, however, open societies allow citizens to express their political 
dissent in a wide range of non-violent ways, thus dampening the potential for political and 
ideological violence. Every society has a unique tolerance for violence, a different threshold, 
beyond which citizens feel their government can no longer protect them.[23] Each government 
must force whatever level of violence exists below that threshold while striving to eradicate the 
root causes and motivations for terrorism itself.  
The Pivotal Role of Civil Society  
But governments cannot do the whole job. At some point, the society itself must take charge of 
countering ideological support for terrorism. Unless a society-at-large can develop consensus for 
a “zero-tolerance” approach to terrorism, its government can only achieve marginal results. But it 
is government’s responsibility to create the environment in which society can, in essence, cure 
itself. Top-down measures have to meet bottom-up measures somewhere in the middle. This is a 
symbiotic relationship that depends on the existence of a healthy and active civil society.  
It is civil society, the space between government institutions and individual citizens, that catalyzes 
the chain reaction needed for zero-tolerance. Civil society contains the opinion leaders who have 
the ability to influence mass audiences in all sectors of a population. What is needed here is a 
“social epidemic,” relying on citizen-messengers to spread positive ideas to friends and neighbors 
until everyone agrees not to support terrorism.[24] Every organization relies on super-connected 
individuals to make things happen; societies and the governments that protect them must take 
the same approach, using the power of what scientists call “scale-free networks” to spread the 
word.[25] Terrorism itself is now generated and sustained through networks, and so must 
countering terrorism. It takes networks to defeat networks.[26]  
Who are these citizen-messengers? One is Amr Khaled, an Egyptian talk-show host and Internet 
master, who has gained tremendous popularity in the Arab world. His philosophical model, 
“Lifemakers”, encourages Muslims to transform their lives through Islam. Khaled has famously 
asked the question, “Who asked Osama bin Laden to talk for us? Nobody.”[27] He is part of the 
growing “Islamic Renewal Movement,” a loose coalition of four broad groups: Civic Islam, Islam 
and Democracy, Reforms within Islam, and Culturally Modern Islam. These strains are tied 
together by their commitment to modernize Islamic institutions, traditions, and practices.[28]  
Another citizen-messenger is Morris Dees, Director of the Southern Poverty Law Center and a 
fierce opponent of the American Militia Movement. Dees and his organization maintain a 
database on militia activities; pursue legal actions against militia groups and individuals; and 
communicate with the rest of American society through a variety of media, including books. The 
Southern Poverty Law Center is not a partner of the U.S. Government, but it has been an 
important ally.[29]  
A clear example of civil society against terrorism can be seen in the actions since 2006 in Al 
Anbar Province in Iraq, where tribal forces have aligned to reject foreign terrorists. Citizen militias, 
properly regulated by the government, have been instrumental in defeating terrorists from Peru to 
Turkey. At the other end of the spectrum, groupings of motivated individuals counter terrorist 
ideology simply by demonstrating that society is normal. Upon winning the Asia Cup (by defeating 
Saudi Arabia) with Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia players, the team was profiled as a model of ethnic 
unity. Civil Society can indeed be the terrorist’s most formidable enemy.[30] The power of civil 
society can be magnified by targeting the youth bulge, particularly in Muslim populations, using 
the ubiquitous information technology available to them.[31]  
With the right catalyst, whole societies can suddenly become powerful enough to destroy 
terrorism. Such was the case in Italy after the Red Brigades terrorist group kidnapped and 
murdered former Prime Minister Aldo Moro. In Jordan, after the brutal attacks on three hotels in 
Amman in November, 2005, support for Abu Musab al Zarqawi evaporated in an avalanche of 
public outrage. The British, conditioned by a tradition of citizen-policing, consider themselves 
soldiers in the war against terrorism rather than victims, the eyes and ears of a vigilant 
government. That attitude is the sharpest tool in the toolkit every government has for fighting 
terrorism. All governments must learn how to use that tool and keep it sharp. 
Building an Alliance Against Radical Ideologies  
Anyone attempting to counter ideological support for terrorism must realize that such efforts can 
only succeed from within the ideological community itself. Governments, Non-Governmental 
Organizations, and individuals from the outside can influence the debate, but they cannot finish it. 
A citizen-messenger like Amr Khaled can have more effect than the entire U.S. Government—but 
he cannot be seen within his community as a partner of the United States. From our perspective, 
the effort to oppose ideologies operating abroad should be called “reducing ideological support 
for terrorism.”[32] That will entail a careful blend of policies and practices designed to enable and 
empower those within the target community to get their messages out. Once out, those 
messages will transmit themselves in a variety of ways along complex social pathways. We wish 
to have others say what we would say if we had the credibility. We then must report, analyze, and 
strengthen the positive trends we see. It is not a surprise that we have countered the ideology 
that drives our own militia movement more successfully than any other. Only the Italian people—
with the moral support of allies—could have countered the Red Brigades.  
In a domestic context, the image of an onion, with a hard core of committed terrorists at its center, 
clarifies the problem and suggests a solution. Overlapping the core are layers of active 
supporters, passive supporters, those who don’t care either way, and those who oppose the 
committed terrorists and their supporters. In this image, the government surrounds the onion 
looking for ways to counter the terrorism produced in the core. Many governments, particularly 
those with the resources, are tempted to use a hammer to smash the onion. Other governments 
have developed a combination of strategies to deal with each of the layers, gently or harshly 
peeling the inner layers away from the core while mobilizing the outer layers against the center. 
The most effective strategies mobilize the moral resources of civil society. Isolating the core 
allows governments to apply coercive force selectively—even surgically—without damaging the 
society itself. Such an approach, over time, can reduce terrorism and the ideology that underlies it.  
The international context is more challenging. Domestic efforts to isolate the hard core often 
result in a terrorist diaspora along networked pathways around the globe. The clarifying image 
here might be a “network of networks.” In this world, relationships are more important than 
capabilities. Individual governments, networked within, must reach out bilaterally and regionally to 
assist other governments isolate hard-core terrorists, while winning the loyalty of their own 
societies. Governments that develop foreign policies that strengthen this network of networks will 
find themselves with improved security at home. We have come to point where terrorism 
anywhere is terrorism everywhere. We should seek to move terrorism to the very fringes of 
human behavior. Once common, piracy, slavery, and genocide have been systematically 
diminished through collective efforts over time.[33] Most importantly, such efforts destroyed the 
ideologies that legitimized these behaviors. Governments must go after ideologically-motivated 
terrorists with the same kind of collective approach.  
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